




A short note on the prisoner’s dilemma as applied to public procurement 
 




The prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes invoked to describe the situation facing 
participants in tenders. Reasoning on the basis of the dilemma metaphor, it is contended 
that agreeing not to bribe public officials in order to win contracts (collaboration) leads to 
better outcomes than bribing (confrontation). Here it is argued that the prisoner’s dilemma 
does not correspond to an adequate metaphor for public tenders. Incidentally, it is also 
argued that the assumption that bribery financially harms participants, which stimulates the 
allusion to the prisoner’s dilemma in the first place, is arbitrary. 
Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma, public procurement. 
JEL classification numbers: D74, H57. 
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The prisoner’s dilemma 
Individuals A and B have been arrested for a crime they committed as accomplices. The prosecutor 
separately presents to each of them the following options: “If you confess, point the finger to your 
accomplice and the latter remains silent, I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to 
ensure that your accomplice is condemned to a long term in prison. Likewise, if your accomplice 
confesses while you remain silent, he will go free while you will go to prison. If both of you confess I 
get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to 
settle for token sentences on a misdemeanor. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer 
before my return tomorrow morning.” 
The problem is to ascertain what would be the best strategy to adopt under such 
circumstances. This is a symmetrical non-zero-sum game with two outcomes, “Confesses” 
or “Stays put”. The possible outcomes are: 
R – Reward for both if both stay put (cooperation). 
P – Reward for both if both confess (mutual confrontation). 
If one chooses to confess and the other to stays put, then the one who has confessed gets T 
points, while the other gets S points (one-sided confrontation). 
Also, the following holds: 
T > R > P > S 
2R > T + S. 
The diagram below summarizes the situation with T = 5 (the reward for confessing 
when the other stays silent), R = 3 (the reward both get when both stay silent), P = 1 (the 
reward both get when both confess) and S = 0 (the result of staying silent while the other 
confesses); the indexes 1 and 2 respectively refer to the outcomes for players 1 and 2 – the 
colours of the outcomes in the diagram also correspond to the respective players: 
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  Player 1 
   Stays  put  Confesses 
R1 = 3  T1 = 5 
Stays put 
R2 = 3  S2 = 0 











T2 = 5  P2 = 1 
 
Given those values for the various parameters, whatever the other does, each is better 
off ratting on the other than remaining silent. However, the outcome obtained when both 
confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained 
silent. As both would reason similarly (they are supposed to be rational), it would appear 
that cooperation between the players (both remaining silent) is a better strategy than any of 
them (or both) entering into confrontation with the other. That is the dilemma. 
One single instance of the game is of limited interest. If the participants iterate the 
game, then the best course for a player to follow is claimed to be the so-called “tit for tat” 
strategy – whereby the player starts by cooperating in the first move but afterwards copies 
the opponent’s last move. According to [Axelrod and Hamilton 1981] and many others, this 
strategy consistently yields better outcomes than all others tested in computer simulation 
tournaments in which the “players” are populations that adopt different strategies while 
competing to survive. 
Although the prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes mentioned in reference to bribery in 
public procurement, it is not clear how exactly it enters the problem. Written references to 
the analogy appear sporadically in the literature, as e.g. [Rose-Ackerman 1999] p. 31 and 
[Andvig and Fjeldstad 2000] p. 22 (but see below, footnote 2). 
As a matter of formal adequacy, such a parallel is not possible, because the application 
of the prisoner’s dilemma metaphor to the problem facing firms participating in 
procurement (to bribe or not to bribe) is not strictly appropriate. Directly applying the 
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dilemma to the procurement situation would entail substituting “Doesn’t bribe” for “Stays 
put” and “Bribes” for “Confesses”. This would lead to the following game diagram: 
  Bidder A 
 
  Doesn’t 
bribe  Bribes 
R1 = 3  T1 = 5  Doesn’t 
bribe  R2 = 3  S2 = 0 











T2 = 5  P2 = 1 
 
However, in a two-participant tender, what would be the meaning of both bidders 
paying bribes, each of them being equally rewarded with a pittance? In a typical corrupted 
tender, one of the participants bribes public officials in order to win the contract, but the 
others do not (of course, there can be a previous “bribery tender” whereby one single 
participant gets the upper hand).1 So, the lower right-hand cell is not a possible outcome in 
such a game. Likewise, the upper left-hand cell also lacks meaning. The aim of 
procurement is not to partition a contract between participants, but to select a unique 
winner. 
If the metaphor refers to repetitions of the game and not to one single instantiation, 
then the parameters R, T, S, P would represent the aggregation of a series of individual 
outcomes. In order to get to a similar numerical set-up, the probabilities of each outcome 
would have to be equally distributed. But, then, enters a further difficulty, that was not 
mentioned before because it was not necessary for the argument: What is the justification to 
posit that P < R (the outcome of winning contracts with bribery is less for the participant 
than the outcome of winning cleanly)? If this held in the real world, then firms that 
participate in public procurement in environments affected by bribery would consistently 
                                                 
1   In tenders with three or more participants, two of them can simultaneously bribe in order to get rid of 
some or all the others. This is what happens when cartels operate. 
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and irrationally lose money. As this is not plausible, and in view of the previous reasoning, 
it is concluded that the prisoner’s dilemma does not properly describe the problem facing 
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2    [Andvig et. al. 2000] p. 22 footnote rises doubts about the applicability of the prisoner’s dilemma 
analogy to the context of public contracting. 
 